The long march to war

The long march to war

As the India-China crisis escalated, so did vehement criticism of Nehru. Dorothy Woodman, an eminent British politician and scholar of that time, has written that the prime minister was “loudly abused”. Critics demanded that he should fight the Chinese head-on, if necessary, by entering into “cooperative defence with other powers”, a euphemism for accepting foreign military aid. For the first time, Nehru found it impossible to lead public opinion — but also refused to be led by it.

Even considering any abandonment of nonalignment was unacceptable to him. “It is the surest sign of weakness to ask others to save us from external danger... (That) would jeopardize our freedom and shatter completely our place in the world”. He explained that his policy was to “settle matters peacefully, so far as possible,” just as it was also his “firm policy to fight, if necessary.”

By then Nehru clearly stood alone. So much so that on November 27, 1959, he told the Lok Sabha: “If this House thinks that the way our government has carried on this particular work is not satisfactory, it is open to the House to choose more competent men... But if this prime minister has to face this challenge, then hold to him and help him, and don’t come in his way.”

Meanwhile, the exchange of angry notes between India and China and threatening Chinese activity along the border continued. But there was an important change. There was no repetition of the kind of bloodletting that had taken place at Kongka-La in October (‘How Chinese Challenge Erupted’, IE, May 23). Instead, the emphasis was on talks. In December 1959, Nehru declined Zhou’s sudden invitation, at a mere fortnight’s notice, to meet him either in Rangoon or Beijing. The suggested terms of discourse were exactly what Nehru had rejected already.

... contd.

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